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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
Garth, Circuit Judge. 
The only issue on this appeal is whether Enterprise 
Holdings, Inc.,1
                                                          
1 Enterprise Holdings, Inc. itself is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of a holding company called the Crawford Group, Inc.  The 
Crawford Group is not a party to this action. 
 (“Enterprise Holdings”), which is the sole 
stockholder of thirty eight domestic subsidiaries, is a joint 
employer of the subsidiaries’ assistant managers within the 
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meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  In order 
to answer this question, we must define the contours of the 
term “joint employer.” 
 The District Court, in a comprehensive opinion,2 held 
that Enterprise Holdings, Inc. was not a joint employer.3  In 
doing so, the District Court determined that the standard to 
which it applied its findings of fact was found in Lewis v. 
Vollmer of America, No. 05-1632, 2008 WL 355607 (W.D. 
Pa. Feb. 7, 2008) and Bonnette v. California Health & 
Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1981), 
abrogated on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Transit 
Authority
Although the standard we prescribe varies in some 
respects from the District Court’s test, we hold that the 
District Court did not err in deciding for the appellee, 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc. and thus, in not certifying the class 
which the plaintiffs seek.  We therefore will affirm the 
District Court’s August 13, 2010 order which granted 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment. 
, 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985).  We will discuss those 
two cases, together with additional factors, which we hold to 
be significant in defining “joint employer” under the FLSA.   
 
                                                          
2 See In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment 
Practice Litigation, 735 F.Supp.2d 277 (W.D.Pa.2010). 
 
3 The District Court referred to the parent company Enterprise 
Holdings, Inc. as ERAC-Missouri in its opinion.  Those terms 
refer to the same entity, the defendant Enterprise Holdings, 
Inc.  Throughout this opinion, we will refer to the parent 
company as Enterprise Holdings, Inc. 
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Plaintiff Nickolas Hickton was a former assistant 
branch manager employed at Enterprise-Rent-a-Car Company 
of Pittsburgh.  On December 11, 2007, Hickton filed a 
nationwide collective class action under the FLSA in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  Hickton claimed that the 
defendant, Enterprise Holdings, Inc., the parent company of 
Enterprise-Rent-a-Car Company of Pittsburgh, violated the 
FLSA by failing to pay required overtime wages.   
I. 
The FLSA provides that:  
[n]o employer shall employ 
any of his employees who in 
any workweek is engaged in 
commerce or in the production 
of goods for commerce, or is 
employed in an enterprise 
engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for 
commerce, for a workweek 
longer than forty hours unless 
such employee receives 
compensation for his 
employment in excess of the 
hours above specified at a rate 
not less than one and one-half 
times the regular rate at which 




29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  Some employees are classified as 
exempt under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a), and are 
consequently exceptions to this rule. 
Hickton’s action, filed on behalf of all individuals 
employed during the putative class period as branch 
managers or assistant branch managers at the various 
Enterprise locations,4 named both Enterprise Holdings, Inc.5 
and Enterprise Rent-a-Car Company of Pittsburgh as 
defendants.  By order of the United States Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation, similar actions pending in other 
Districts were transferred to the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.6
                                                          
4 At this time, Hickton no longer pursues claims on behalf of 
branch managers.  He pursues his claims only on behalf of 
assistant branch managers. 
  Since that time, a number of other cases have 
 
5 At the time, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. was known as 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company, Inc. 
 
6 The transferred cases were DePina v. Enterprise Leasing 
Co. of Orlando, No. 09-359 (M.D.Fla.); Graham v. 
Enterprise Leasing Co., No. 07-23373 (S.D.Fla.); Gaudelli v. 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Tennessee, No. 09-580 
(N.D.Ga.); Averill v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., No. 08-4191 
(N.D.Ill.); Galia v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., No. 09-1504 





also been transferred pursuant to the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation’s order.7
On October 23, 2009, Hickton, along with other named 
plaintiffs, filed an Amended Master Complaint on behalf of 
themselves and all other current and former assistant branch 
managers of Enterprise locations.  The Complaint alleged that 
the plaintiffs’ employers had unlawfully classified them as 
exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions, and sought 
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, 
and costs.  In addition to the respective subsidiaries for whom 
the various plaintiffs worked, the Complaint also alleged that 
the parent company, Enterprise Holdings, Inc., was liable for 
the overtime pay as a joint employer of the plaintiffs. 
 
As we have noted, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. is the sole 
shareholder of 38 domestic subsidiaries, such as Enterprise 
Rent-a-Car Company of Pittsburgh, which rents and sells 
vehicles and conducts other business under the “Enterprise” 
brand name.  These various subsidiaries each have branch 
                                                          
7 Those cases are Steen v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., No. 10-
83 (E.D.N.C.); Modiri v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., No. 10-
2239 (D.Nev.); Hagler v. Enterprise Leasing Company-South 
Central, Inc., No. 09-1321 (N.D.Ala.); Lamothe v. Enterprise 
Holdings, Inc., No. 11-609 (E.D.Va.); Hardy v. Enterprise 
Holdings, Inc., No. 10-953 (D.Or.); Douty v. Enterprise 
Holdings, Inc., No. 10-2660 (D.Md.); and Schieser v. 




locations, and the plaintiff-appellants are all former assistant 
managers at various branches of these subsidiaries.8   
The record reveals the following facts.  Enterprise 
Holdings, Inc. does not directly rent or sell vehicles.  These 
activities are carried on only by its 38 subsidiaries.  However, 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc. directly and indirectly, supplies 
administrative services and support to each subsidiary.  These 
services include, but are not limited to, business guidelines, 
employee benefit plans, rental reservation tools, a central 
customer contact service, insurance, technology, and legal 
services.  The business guidelines provided by Enterprise 
Holdings, Inc. to its subsidiaries are, in turn, distributed to the 
subsidiaries’ employees in a manual which states that 
“[i]nformation contained in [this manual] refers to employees 
of: [t]he Crawford Group, Inc., Enterprise Rent-A-Car 
Company and their various operating subsidiaries.”   
II. 
The District Court found that the use of these services 
was optional in the discretion of the individual subsidiaries, 
but that in exchange for these services, each of the 
subsidiaries pays corporate dividends and management fees to 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc.  At all times relevant to this appeal, 
the Board of Directors of each subsidiary consisted solely of 
the same three people: Andrew C. Taylor, Pamela W. 
Nicholson, and William W. Snyder, all of whom also served 
                                                          
8 The Enterprise website does not draw any distinction 
between Enterprise Holdings, Inc. or its 38 subsidiaries, and 
represents that “Enterprise Rent-a-Car” has a fleet of nearly 
900,000 rental vehicles, 64,000 employees, and 6,900 offices 
throughout the world. 
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on the Board of Directors of Enterprise Holdings, Inc.  They 
served, respectively, as Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), President and Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), and Executive Vice President and 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO). 
In addition, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. has a human 
resources department, which provides certain services to 
subsidiaries, including, among other things, job descriptions, 
best practices, and compensation guides.  These best practices 
and guides recommend which employees of subsidiaries 
should be salaried, and which employees should receive an 
hourly wage.  The human resources department also 
negotiates health plans which are offered to employees of 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc. and to employees of the 
subsidiaries.  Participation in such plans is not required, but if 
a subsidiary’s employee enrolls in the various benefit 
programs, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. bills that subsidiary for 
the benefits the employee elects.  Additionally, the human 
resources department provides assistance in relocation for 
employees transferring from one subsidiary to another, and 
maintains a list of available employment opportunities with 
any of Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s subsidiaries.   
The human resources department, in addition, provides 
training materials to subsidiaries, and supplies a standard 
performance review form for evaluating employees of 
subsidiaries.  Finally, through both its business guidelines and 
various human resources documents, Enterprise Holdings, 
Inc. recommends salary ranges for branch employees.  The 
District Court found that each individual subsidiary can 
choose to use any or all of these guidelines or services in its 
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own discretion; none of these guidelines or services are 
mandatory. 
The District Court also found that at a 2005 meeting 
attended by representatives of Enterprise Holdings, Inc. and 
its subsidiaries, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. “recommended” 
that the subsidiaries not pay overtime wages to “Assistant 
Managers” and “Assistant Branch Managers” who were 
employed by subsidiaries other than the California 
subsidiaries. 
 Enterprise Holdings, Inc. moved9 for summary 
judgment on the grounds that it was not a “joint employer” of 
the plaintiffs, and therefore was not liable under the FLSA.  
The District Court granted its motion for summary judgment 
and the plaintiffs timely appealed. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Pursuant to the District Court’s 
May 17, 2011 order certifying this case for interlocutory 
appeal, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  § 1292 (b). 
III. 
 We review a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of North America
                                                          
9 Enterprise Holdings had also moved to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of specific jurisdiction.  The 
District Court denied that motion without prejudice.  Because 
this issue is no longer relevant and was not appealed, we do 
not address it.  
, 
642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011).  “Summary judgment is 
appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact to 
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be resolved and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Alcoa, Inc. v. United States
 The mere existence of some disputed fact will not 
result in the denial of a summary judgment motion—nor need 
the District Court decide that every factor weighs against joint 
employment.  
, 509 F.3d 173, 
175 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.
We apply the same standard of review that was applied 
by the District Court. 
, 355 F.3d 61, 76-
77 (2d Cir. 2003).   
 Hickton and the plaintiffs contend that Enterprise 
Holdings violated 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(2), which provides that 
“[n]o employer shall employ any of his employees  . . . for a 
workweek longer than forty hours . . . unless such employee 
receives” overtime compensation or is exempt from receiving 
overtime pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(b).  The resolution of 
this appeal therefore requires us to identify the appropriate 
test to determine whether a defendant is a plaintiff’s joint 
employer for purposes of the FLSA.   
IV. 
The FLSA defines an employer as “any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation 
to an employee.”  29 U.S.C. § 203(d).  The applicable federal 
regulations also provide as a definition of an employer-
employee relationship under the FLSA “[w]here the 
employers are not completely disassociated with respect to 
the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed 
to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by 
reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, 
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or is under common control with the other employer.”    29 
C.F.R. § 791.2(b).  A “single individual may stand in the 
relation of an employee to two or more employers at the same 
time under the [FLSA].”  29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a).  “A 
determination of whether the employment by the employers is 
to be considered joint employment or separate and distinct 
employment for purposes of the act depends upon all the facts 
in the particular case.”  
 When determining whether someone is an employee 
under the FLSA, “economic reality rather than technical 
concepts is to be the test of employment.”  
Id. 
Goldberg v. 
Whitaker House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Under this theory, the FLSA 
defines employer “expansively,” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992), and with “striking 
breadth.”  Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 
730 (1947).  The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to 
acknowledge that the FLSA’s definition of an employer is 
“the broadest definition that has ever been included in any 
one act.”  United States v. Rosenwasser
 This court has not yet had the opportunity to consider 
the appropriate standard for determining whether a defendant 
is a plaintiff’s “employer” within the meaning of that term 
under the FLSA.  We therefore look both to this court’s 
jurisprudence for determining employer-employee status in 
related contexts and to the jurisprudence of our sister circuits. 
, 323 U.S. 360, 363 
n.3 (1945). 
 We are of the view that the starting point for the joint 
employer test should be N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. 
of PA., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982).  We conclude 
that “where two or more employers exert significant control 
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over the same employees—[whether] from the evidence it can 
be shown that they share or co-determine those matters 
governing essential terms and conditions of employment—
they constitute ‘joint employers’” under the FLSA.  Id. at 
1124; see also Moldenhauer v. Tazewell-Pekin Consol. 
Communications Ctr., 536 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008).  This is 
consistent with the FLSA regulations regarding joint 
employment, which state that a joint employment relationship 
will generally be considered to exist “[w]here the employers 
are not completely disassociated with respect to the 
employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to 
share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by 
reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, 
or is under common control with another employer.”  29 
C.F.R. § 791.2(b).  Ultimate control is not necessarily 
required to find an employer-employee relationship under the 
FLSA, and even “indirect” control may be sufficient.  In other 
words, the alleged employer must exercise “significant 
control” Browning-Ferris
In 
, 691 F.2d at 1124. 
Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 
704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit created 
a test for determining whether an employer was a joint 
employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  In Bonnette, 
the Ninth Circuit considered: “whether the alleged employer 
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) 
supervised and controlled employee work schedules or 
conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and 
method of payment, and (4) maintained employment 
records.”  Bonnette, supra
 Although the 
, 704 F.2d at 1470. 
Bonnette court set out four specific 
inquiries to determine joint employment status, close 
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examination of those inquiries reveals that they serve to 
identify whether the alleged joint employer exerts significant 
control over the relevant employees.  The Bonnette test is 
unsurprisingly, therefore, quite similar to the standard 
employed by the District Court in the present case to grant 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment.  
The District Court drew upon its own test to identify 
employment relationships under the ADEA and Title VII in 
Lewis v. Vollmer of America, No. 05-1632, 2008 WL 355607 
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2008).  Lewis, which referred to our 
precedent in Browning-Ferris, set forth three factors to be 
considered in determining whether an entity is an employer: 
“1) authority to hire and fire employees, promulgate work 
rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, 
including compensation, benefits, and hours; 2) day-to-day 
supervision of employees, including employee discipline; and 
3) control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, 
taxes and the like.”  (Citation omitted). 
 The District Court found that these factors were 
consistent with the Department of Labor regulations and with 
A. 
Bonnette.  The same factors were also applied by the First 
and Second Circuits in Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. 
Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998) and Zheng, supra, 
both of which adopted the Bonnette
 Because of the uniqueness of the FLSA, a 
determination of joint employment “must be based on a 
consideration of the total employment situation and the 
economic realities of the work relationship.”  
 test in full. 
Bonnette, 704 
F.2d at 1470.  A simple application of the Lewis test would 
only find joint employment where an employer had direct 
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control over the employee, but the FLSA designates those 
entities with sufficient indirect control as well.  We therefore 
conclude that while the factors outlined today in Lewis are 
instructive they cannot, without amplification, serve as the 
test for determining joint employment under the FLSA. 
 In refining the 
B. 
Lewis
 We emphasize, however, that these factors do not 
constitute an exhaustive list of all potentially relevant facts, 
and should not be “blindly applied.”  
 factors, we would modify them 
as follows: does the alleged employer have: (1) authority to 
hire and fire employees; (2) authority to promulgate work 
rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, 
including compensation, benefits, and hours; (3) day-to-day 
supervision, including employee discipline; and (4) control of 
employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes, and the 
like.  These factors are not materially different than those 
used by our sister circuits, and reflect the facts that will 
generally be most relevant in a joint employment context. 
See Bonnette, 704 F.2d 
1469-70.  A determination as to whether a defendant is a joint 
employer “must be based on a consideration of the total 
employment situation and the economic realities of the work 
relationship.”  Id., 1470l; see Goldberg v. Whitaker House 
Co-op, Inc., 336 U.S. 28, 33 (1961).  Therefore, district courts 
should not be confined to “narrow legalistic definitions” and 
must instead consider all the relevant evidence, including 
evidence that does not fall neatly within one of the above 
factors.  Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., supra, 355 F.3d at 71; 
see Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 
(1947) (explaining that whether an employment relationship 
exists under the FLSA “does not depend on . . . isolated 
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factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole 
activity”); 29 C.F.R. 791.2(a) (stating that the determination 
“depends upon all the facts in the particular case”).  We make 
clear, however, that the Lewis
To summarize: When faced with a question requiring 
examination of a potential joint employment relationship 
under the FLSA, we conclude that courts should consider: 1) 
the alleged employer’s authority to hire and fire the relevant 
employees; 2) the alleged employer’s authority to promulgate 
work rules and assignments and to set the employees’ 
conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and work 
schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) the 
alleged employer’s involvement in day-to-day employee 
supervision, including employee discipline; and 4) the alleged 
employer’s actual control of employee records, such as 
payroll, insurance, or taxes.  As we have noted, however, this 
list is not exhaustive, and cannot be “blindly applied” as the 
sole considerations necessary to determine joint employment.  
 factors provide a useful 
analytical framework and may generally serve as the starting 
point for a district court’s analysis, as they did here, 
especially in the parent-subsidiary context. 
Id.
Therefore, we hold that the test for “joint employer” 
under the FLSA is as we have fashioned it, a melding of the 
modified 
, 1469-70.  If a court concludes that other indicia of 
“significant control” are present to suggest that a given 
employer was a joint employer of an employee, that 
determination may be persuasive, when incorporated with the 
individual factors we have set forth.   
Lewis test and the Bonnette test, consistent with 
those considerations of the real world where such additional 
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economic concerns are prominent.  We will refer to this test 
as the Enterprise
The plaintiffs here stress consideration of factors other 
than those that we have held to constitute a test of joint 
employment.  They have stressed that through the 
interlocking directorates of the Board of Directors of each of 
the subsidiaries, which consist of three individuals who are 
also on the Board of Directors of the parent company, 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc. maintains that degree of control that 
would classify it as an employer.  They also claim that the 
nature of the business of renting vehicles, which involves 
both the subsidiaries and the parent, is a further compelling 
indication of joint employment.  They further argue that 
because the various employment systems and benefits are 
recommended by Enterprise Holdings, Inc., they in effect are 
mandatory and not merely recommendations, and, as such, 
constitute the control which meets the test of a “joint 
employer.”  Additionally, they have focused on the one aspect 
of the District Court’s analysis where the District Court held 
that the first 
 test for ease of reference. 
Lewis (now the first Enterprise)
We are not impressed by these claims.  We first note 
that the record does not support the plaintiffs’ claims that 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s recommendations were anything 
more than recommendations.  In particular, we have studied 
the record most closely, and conclude that the plaintiffs 
 factor was 
neutral in its effect and the question of “recommendations vs. 
mandatory” policies was a disputed fact.  Thus, they maintain 
that in addition to the District Court erring in finding no joint 
employment, it erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
summary judgment should be granted to the defendant, 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc. 
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produced no evidence that Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s actions 
at any time amounted to mandatory directions rather than 
mere recommendations.  We agree that in addition to the 
factors of the Enterprise test, all factors, including the fact of 
interlocking directorates, and the nature of the business being 
conducted by the parent and the subsidiaries, are to be 
considered and weighed in deciding whether a joint employer 
status has been found.  However, we cannot conclude that 
these facts suggest that the District Court committed error in 
granting summary judgment.  Quite to the contrary, the 
evidence that was taken by the District Court was 
comprehensive in detail and in scope and explored all the 
factors that our Enterprise test requires.  We point out also 
that the one aspect of the District Court’s analysis where the 
District Court found an Enterprise factor to be neutral cannot 
affect the balance of the District Court’s reasoned 
conclusions, with which we agree, and cannot defeat 
summary judgment.  See Zheng, supra; Davis v. Walt Disney 
Co., 430 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Factual disputes 
regarding a single factor are insufficient to support the 
reversal of summary judgment unless they tilt the entire 
balance in favor of such a finding.”);  Moreau v. Air France
Applying the 
, 
356 F.3d 942, 952 (9th Cir. 2004) (two factors favoring a 
finding of joint employment do “not outweigh the numerous 
significant factors . . . which weigh heavily against finding a 
joint employer relationship,” and summary judgment was 
appropriate).     
Enterprise test to the facts before us, we 
conclude that the District Court was correct in its 
determination that Enterprise Holdings, Inc. was not a joint 
employer of Hickton or the other assistant managers.   
20 
 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc. had no authority to hire or 
fire assistant managers, no authority to promulgate work rules 
or assignments, and no authority to set compensation, 
benefits, schedules, or rates or methods of payment.  
Furthermore, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. was not involved in 
employee supervision or employee discipline, nor did it 
exercise or maintain any control over employee records.   
While the plaintiffs contend that Enterprise Holdings, 
Inc. functionally held many of these roles by way of the 
guidelines and manuals it promulgated to its subsidiaries, we 
are not influenced by this claim.  Inasmuch as the adoption of 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s suggested policies and practices 
was entirely discretionary on the part of the subsidiaries, 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc. had no more authority over the 
conditions of the assistant managers’ employment than would 
a third-party consultant who made suggestions for 
improvements to the subsidiaries’ business practices.  Each of 
the individual factors indicates that Enterprise Holdings was 
not an employer of Hickton or the other assistant managers, a 
conclusion that is bolstered by the readily apparent fact that 
Enterprise Holdings exercised no control, let alone significant 
control, over the assistant managers. 
When a legal standard requires the balancing of 
multiple factors, as it does in this case, summary judgment 
may still be appropriate even if not all of the factors favor one 
party—this is such a case.  The evidence in the instant case so 
favors the defendant that we conclude no reasonable juror 
could find that Enterprise Holdings, Inc. was the plaintiffs’ 
employer, and that the grant of summary judgment to 
Enterprise Holdings, Inc. under the Enterprise test we have 
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adopted was correct, even though one factor may have been 
deemed to favor the plaintiffs or been found to be neutral.10
Thus, under the test we have set forth, and having 
considered, as the District Court considered, all facts and 
circumstances revealed by the record, including elements of 
the nature of the car rental business and the interlocking 
directorates, we conclude that the District Court was correct 
in its summary judgment conclusion and that the plaintiffs 
have failed to demonstrate that Enterprise Holdings, Inc., the 
parent of the 38 subsidiaries, is a joint employer of the branch 
assistant managers. 
 







                                                          
10  Judge Smith is of the view that while Enterprise Holdings, 
Inc. has the legal authority to hire, fire, set assignments, etc., 
which bears on the first two factors of the Enterprise test, 
given the complete absence of exercised control, this legal 
authority is insufficient to confer joint-employer status as a 
matter of law. 
